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I. INTRODUCTION
At approximately two o'clock in the afternoon on October 30,
1973, radio station WBAI-FM broadcast a twelve minute satiriza-
tion of contemporary attitudes toward seven" 'words you couldn't
say on the public . . . air waves. . . .' "I The satirization was part
of a "general discussion of contemporary society's attitude toward
language . "2 Four days later, a father who had been listening
to the program with his son filed a complaint with the Federal
1. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 729 (1978). The segment was part of a
monologue, entitled Filthy Words, recorded by comedian George Carlin on his album, George
Carlin, Occupation: Foole. Immediately preceding the broadcast, the station, which was
licensed to the Pacifica Foundation, warned that controversial language would be used and
advised listeners to change stations during the broadcast. Id. at 730. A transcript of the
monologue may be found in the appendix of the Supreme Court's decision. Id. at 751-55.
2. Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726
(1978).
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Communications Commission (FCC) protesting that the program's
language was offensive.' After receiving WBAI's reply,' the FCC
held that the language "as broadcast" was not obscene, but was
indecent and therefore prohibited by 18 U.S.C. section 1464.1 On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Col-
umbia Circuit reversed.' In a five to four decision, the Supreme
Court reversed the Court of Appeals and upheld the FCC's power
to sanction broadcasters of indecent speech.'
Like the father in Pacifica, the courts have expressed concern
over the language to which children are exposed. These courts have
developed a "protect the children" rationale to justify restrictions
on the speech to which children may be subjected.' Application of
this rationale to broadcasting, however, raises difficult first amend-
ment questions because the broadcast media are both subject to
extensive regulation' and protected by the first amendment."o The
Supreme Court has recognized the unique status of the broadcast
media and approved regulation of program content that could not
be applied constitutionally to other media."
3. The complaint stated in relevant part: "Any child could have been turning the dial,
and tuned in to that garbage. . . . Incidentally my young son was with me when I heard the
above." Pacifica Foundation, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 95 (1975), 32 RAD. REG. 2d 1331, 1332 (P&F),
rev'd, 556 F.2d 9 (1977), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). John R. Douglas, a member of the national
planning board of Morality in Media, filed the sole complaint. See WBAI Ruling: Supreme
Court Saves the Worst for the Last, BROADCASTING, July 10, 1978, at 20.
4. In its response Pacifica described Carlin as a "'significant social satirist of American
manners and language in the tradition of Mark Twain and Mort Sahl' and stated that Carlin
was .'merely using words to satirize as harmless and essentially silly our attitudes towards
those words."' 56 F.C.C.2d at 96, 32 RAD. REG. 2d at 1333-34.
5. Id. at 98-99, 32 RAD. REG. 2d at 1336-39. See notes 13-16 infra and accompanying text.
Section 1464 makes the radio broadcast of "any obscene, indecent, or profane language" a
criminal offense.
6. Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978);
see notes 17-22 infra and accompanying text.
7. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). See notes 23-28 infra and accompa-
nying text.
8. See, e.g., 438 U.S. at 749-50.
9. The Federal Communications Commission is empowered to exercise broad regulatory
authority over both substantive and technical aspects of radio and television broadcasting.
Its statutory foundation is 47 U.S.C. H§ 151-609 (1976). See generally CBS, Inc. v. Demo-
cratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 103-11 (1973); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 375-77 (1969); B. SCHMIDT, JR., FREEDOM OF THE PRESS Vs. Puuc AccEsS 125-31 (1976).
10. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969). See Part IV of this
Note. See generally Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941); Robinson, The FCC
and the First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52
MINN. L. REv. 67 (1967); Note, Pacifica Foundation v. FCC: "Filthy Words, " the First
Amendment and the Broadcast Media, 78 CoLuM. L. REv. 164 (1978).
11. Compare Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), with Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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This Note examines the "protect the children" rationale as
justification for the regulation of program content to determine if it
is likely to withstand future challenges. Initially, the Note reviews
the Pacifica decisions to illustrate how the rationale recently has
been employed. The Note then considers this rationale in light of
traditional first amendment analysis and the interface of that anal-
ysis with the rights of children, concluding that the rationale does
not justify abridgment of the first amendment. The Note then con-
siders the effect of broadcasting's "unique characteristics" upon
this analysis,12 concluding that this added element does not tip the
balance in favor of "protection". Finally, the Note examines other
areas in which programming content has been regulated to protect
children and offers proposals as to how children constitutionally
may be protected from potentially harmful broadcasts.
II. PROTECTIONISM AND THE Pacifica DECISIONS
Cognizant that "indecent"" language had never been prohib-
ited under section 1464 prior to the instant case, the FCC did not
sanction WBAI but stated that it would keep the Order in the sta-
tion's license file for possible sanctioning should further complaints
be received." The FCC later clarified its holding,. stating that the
Order was not an absolute prohibition of "indecent" language but
an attempt to "channel" it to times when children were less likely
to be in the listening audience.15 The strong link between the prohi-
bition of indecent speech and the protection of children was evident
from the Commission's reasoning that "the concept of 'indecent' is
intimately connected with the exposure of children to language that
describes, in terms patently offensive . . . sexual or excretory activ-
ities and organs, at times of the day when there is a reasonable risk
12. This Note does not address the broad statutory powers of the FCC to control the
broadcast media. The primary focus, therefore, will be on the first amendment and other
constitutional aspects of regulation.
13. The courts' discussion of the indecent/obscene dichotomy in this case as well as the
proper construction of 18 U.S.C. §§ 326, 554(e), and 1464 is beyond the scope of this Note.
Instead, this Note will examine solely the courts' protection justification.
14. 56 F.C.C.2d at 99, 32 RAD. REG. 2d at 1337. This was much more serious than a mere
warning because substantiated complaints are considered in the license renewal process to
evaluate whether a station has served the public interest in compliance wth 47 U.S.C. § 307
(1976). The FCC has denied license renewal or has granted only a short term license renewal
in many instances, largely as a result of such complaints. See, e.g., Jack Straw Memorial
Foundation, 21 F.C.C. 2d 833, 18 RAD. REG. 2d 414 (P&F) (1970) (short term renewal);
Palmetto Broadcasting Co., 33 F.C.C. 250, 23 RAD. REG. 2d 483 (P&F) (1962), aff'd sub nom.
Robinson v. FCC, 334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 843 (1964) (denied license
renewal).
15. Pacifica Foundation, 59 F.C.C. 2d 892, 36 RAD. REG. 2d 1008 (P&F) (1976)..
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that children may be in the audience.""
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit reversed the Commission's Order.17 Judge Tamm, writ-
ing for the court, held that the Order was censorship regardless of
the channeling language because the Commission had stated that
even if the broadcast exhibited literary, artistic, political or scien-
tific value, it could not have been broadcast at a time when great
numbers of children were in the audience. Judge Tcmm pointed out
that because large numbers of children are in the broadcast audi-
ence until 1:30 a.m.," the seven four-letter words could never be
broadcast." Alternatively, Judge Tamm held the Order to be over-
broad. 0 Judge Leventhal, dissenting, argued that the Commission
could regulate the material "'as broadcast'."2 1 Justice Leventhal
stressed that the family should be allowed to choose what its chil-
dren hear. Injury could occur, not only from hearing indecent lan-
guage, but also from exposure to the idea that such language has
official indorsement.22
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Court
of Appeals, holding that the FCC constitutionally could regulate
indecent speech. Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality, found
the presence of children in the listening audience a primary factor
in determining that broadcasting has only limited first amendment
16. 56 F.C.C.2d at 98, 36 RAD. REG. 2d at 1336. The Supreme Court noted the FCC's
suggestion that if an offensive broadcast had literary, artistic, political or scientific value, and
was preceded by warnings, it might not be indecent in the late evening, but would be during
the day when children were in the audience. 438 U.S. at 730 n.5.
17. Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
18. Id. at 13 n.7.
19. Id. at 14. Judge Tamm also noted that because serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value was irrelevant to the ban, the Commission's Order proscribed "the uncen-
sored broadcast of many of the great works of literature including Shakespearian plays,"
contemporary plays that "have won critical acclaim, the works of renowned classical and
contemporary poets and writers, and passages from the Bible." Id.
Chief Judge Bazelon agreed with Judge Tamm on this point. Noting that roughly one-
half of the nation's AM licensees operate only during the daytime, Chief Judge Bazelon
reasoned that channeling was an unacceptable alternative because the order effectively pro-
hibited such stations from airing the material at all and made the material unavailable to
many other potential listeners who, if the material is aired too late, will have gone to bed.
Id. at 20 nn.5 & 6. In support of the latter proposition, Chief Judge Bazelon cited a Nielsen
survey finding that 70% of television households watch television between 9:00 and 10:00
p.m., 46% at 11:00 p.m., and 25% at midnight. Id. at 20 n.6 (citing Nielsen Television, 1975,
at 7). Chief Judge Bazelon also concluded that § 1464 must be construed narrowly to prohibit
only that speech, such as obscenity, which is unprotected by the first amendment. Id. at 24-
30.
20. Id. at 18-20.
21. Id. at 31 (emphasis in the original).
22. Id. at 37 & n.18. Judge Leventhal felt that children's values are protected as long
as children know that pornography is not approved of by either parents or society.
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protection and therefore may be regulated more stringently than
other forms of communication.2 Justice Stevens noted that broad-
casting is a uniquely pervasive form of communication that reaches
"the citizen, not only in public, but also in the privacy of the home
. . . ."24 Justice Stevens reasoned that broadcasting, unlike books
and magazines, cannot be withheld from children while remaining
accessible to adults. Thus, because broadcasting's unique accessi-
bility to children interfered with "the government's interest 'in the
well being of its youth' and in supporting [the] 'parents' claim to
authority in their household,' "" Justice Stevens concluded that
regulation of "indecent" expression was justified. In addition, the
Court approved both channelling0 and the FCC's characterization
of "indecent" languagen as acceptable methods of regulation. Jus-
tice Stevens also emphasized that the Court's holding was limited
to the facts surrounding WBAI's broadcast because indecency can
be accurately ascertained only in the context of a particular broad-
cast?
III. FIRST AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS
Throughout our nation's history, first amendment rights have
held a "preferred place" in our society.29 The first amendment ex-
pressly prohibits the government from abridging an individual's
freedom of speech." The strength of this restriction is embodied in
the statement that "[t]he power of a state to abridge freedom of
speech . . . is the exception rather than the rule." 3'
A. Content Neutrality as a Fundamental Concept
Government abridgment of free speech occurs in two forms.32
First, the government may indirectly restrict the free flow of ideas
and information while pursuing other acceptable goals unrelated to
23. 438 U.S. at 749-50.
24. Id. at 748.
25. Id. at 749 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968)).
26. See text accompanying notes 15 & 16 supra.
27. 438 U.S. at 746.
28. Id. at 742 (plurality opinion only). The Court listed variables that would be re levant
in determining if indecent speech may be prohibited. These variables include: Time of day,
content of the program and the differences between radio, television, and closed circuit
transmissions. Id. at 750 (majority opinion).
29. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
30. The first amendment states in part: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
31. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 258 (1937).
32. For an in-depth discussion of the two categories by which courts analyze freedom
of speech problems, see L. TM, AMERicAN CONsTrrTUoNAL LAw §§ 12-2 to 3 (1978).
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the content of speech. These restrictions are characterized as
content-neutral and include time, place, and manner restrictions
that, although aimed at noncommunicative impact, nevertheless
inhibit communication." When confronted with a content-neutral
restriction, the Court examines the facts surrounding the restriction
and balances the government's regulatory interests against the need
for freedom of expression.34 Under this analysis, a time, place, and
manner regulation is tolerated if it does not unreasonably restrict
the flow of ideas and information."
The second type of governmental abridgment is action that
directly restricts undesirable information or ideas because of the
specific message expressed or the effect the message will have when
distributed. These direct regulations are presumed to be contrary to
the first amendment" because the government may not "restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or
its content"" regardless of its adverse public effects.38 Thus, courts
confronting content-based regulation do not balance the interests as
they do when confronted with content-neutral restrictions. Instead,
courts utilize a strict scrutiny analysis that requires the government
to prove that the regulation furthers a compelling state interest or
that the restricted speech is unprotected under traditional first
amendment analysis.3 ' This strict scrutiny analysis also requires
33. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (upholding ceilings on campaign
contributions); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (government prohibiting use of loud
speakers in residential areas). See generally Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles
of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HAnv. L. REv. 1482 (1975);
Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 20 (1975).
34. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1961).
35. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). The Court in Cox stated: "[Tihe
question in a particular case is whether . . . [a] control is exerted so as not to deny or
unwarrantedly abridge the right of assembly and the opportunities for the communications
of thought." Id. at 574.
36. See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966) (invalidating a prohibition against
discussing a political candidate on the last days of election); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923) (striking down a ban on the teaching of a foreign language). See L. TRmE, supra
note 32, at § 12-2.
37. Police Dep't. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
38. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
39. As the Court stated in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), "the First
Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance." Id. at 483. Those words deemed
unprotected by the first amendment are obscenity, libel, fighting words, and speech consti-
tuting a clear and present danger to the public. This rigid categorical approach to the
protected-unprotected dichotomy originated from dicta in Chaplinski v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568 (1942). The two-level approach still wholly applies to obscenity and fighting words,
but one commentator feels the demise of the rigid categorization is imminent. Goldman, A
Doctrine of Worthier Speech: Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 21 ST. Louis U.L.J.
281, 282 (1977).
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that the regulation be tailored to the permissible state objective
such that no reasonable alternative would have a less onerous im-
pact on fundamental rights. 0 Moreover, once determined to be
content-based, a regulation may not be justified by a claim that the
content of the message has been adequately voiced by other speak-
ers or that the expression may be voiced in another place, at another
time, or in another manner.4
The equality of ideas doctrine is a corollary to the principle that
government may not discriminate among protected communica-
tions on the basis of content. When dealing with protected commu-
nication, the Court has consistently held that all ideas are equally
important and deserving of first amendment protection .4 Thus, the
Court does not distinguish speech based upon quality, subject mat-
ter, or the personal preferences of the Justices once the speech is
determined to be protected by the first amendment.
A recurring debate in first amendment jurisprudence is whether
the requirement of content neutrality is absolute. Justice Black,
who took an absolute approach, originally articulated the require-
ment. Justice Black argued that the first amendment phrase "no
law" meant just that and that any content-based regulation was
unconstitutional.43 The Court as a whole, however, often has
adopted the concept of content neutrality without accepting Justice
Black's absolute approach. For example, in the landmark decision
upholding the requirement of content neutrality, Police Department
of Chicago v. Mosley," the Court invalidated an ordinance that
proscribed all picketing of schools except peaceful labor picketing,
reasoning that the ordinance was content-based because it distin-
guished between the different messages expressed by the picketers."
40. Note, Constitutional Law-First Amendment-Content Neutrality, 28 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 456, 473 (1978).
41. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 757 n.15 (1976); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 n.4 (1974).
42. Although it has been suggested that speech on public issues mandates greater
protection than private speech, A. MEmDLoETHN, FREE SPEECH 92-107 (1948), the Court has
refused to distinguish speech on theoretical levels. For example, the Court in Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) stated that: "Great secular causes, with small ones, are
guarded. . . . And the rights of free speech and a free press are not confined to any field of
human interest." Id. at 531. Justice Powell, as recently as 1975, agreed that "the Constitution
does not permit government to decide which types of otherwise protected speech are suffi-
ciently offensive to require protection for the unwilling listener. . . ." Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210 (1975).
43. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 398 (1967) (Black, J., concurring); Konigs-
berg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); American Communications
Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 445 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting).
44. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
45. Id. at 99-102.
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Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, qualified his application of
the neutrality principle by holding that a state could prohibit pick-
eting in certain circumstances "to protect public order," but noted
that "these justifications for selective exclusions from a public
forum must be carefully scrutinized."" The majority, applying a
strict scrutiny analysis, found that although there was a substantial
governmental interest, the nexus between means and ends was in-
sufficient. Thus, the Mosley Court's ban on content-based distinc-
tions, while not absolute, raises a presumption against their validity
by subjecting them to the rigorous strict scrutiny test. 7
A more recent decision, Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,"
applied Mosley's equal liberty of expression standard. The
Erznoznik Court invalidated an ordinance that prohibited drive-in
theatres with screens "'visible from any public street or place' ""
from showing any movie that contained nudity. In rejecting the
city's argument that the ordinance was intended to eliminate a
nuisance, 0 Justice Powell stated that "when the government, acting
as censor, undertakes selectively to shield the public from some
kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive than
others, the First Amendment strictly limits its power."5 1 Finding
that the ordinance's objectives failed to justify the regulation of
nonobscene speech on the basis of content, the Court declared the
statute invalid. Although this balancing technique seems less strin-
gent than the Mosley analysis, the Court nevertheless maintained
a presumption of invalidity for content based distinctions, which,
to survive, must "satisfy the rigorous constitutional standards that
apply when government attempts to regulate expression."52
In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.," the Court deviated
from the Mosley principle and upheld a zoning ordinance that re-
stricted the locations of new theatres showing sexually explicit
"adult" movies. The ordinance required an examination of the con-
tent of the movies to determine whether to characterize them as
"adult." Upholding the ordinance, a plurality of the Court pur-
46. Id. at 98-99.
47. One commentator praised the Court's decision for "explicitly adopt[ing] the prin-
ciple of equal liberty of expression." Karst, supra note 33, at 28. He acknowledged that,
although "absolute equality is a practical impossibility," deviation from this basic assump-
tion is permitted "only upon a showing of substantial necessity." Id.
48. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
49. Id. at 207 (quoting the ordinance).
50. The city used protection of juveniles as another justification, but the Court found
the total ban on nudity overinclusive. Id. at 212-14.
51. Id. at 209.
52. Id. at 217.
53. 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (plurality opinion by Stevens, J.).
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ported to establish a lower standard of protection for admittedly
nonobscene but nevertheless "erotic materials." The new standard
permitted content-based distinctions when the "record discloses a
factual basis for . . . [achieving] the desired effect.""
Prior to Young, the Court had not found a state's interest in
protecting its citizens from less than obscene speech sufficient to
justify content regulation. Citing Erznoznik, Justice Stewart, in dis-
sent, espoused the traditional view that content distinctions were
simply not permitted under the first amendment"5 and that the
plurality's decision constituted a "drastic departure from estab-
lished principles."" The Young Court, consistent with precedent,7
could have reached its desired result without adopting a new stan-
dard by acknowledging the presumptive unconstitutionality of the
ordinance and applying either Mosley's strict scrutiny analysis or
Erznoznik's rigorous balancing.
In terms of first amendment jurisprudence, the Young plurality
took a new and somewhat unusual approach. Although recognizing
that precedent demanded content-neutral regulation, the plurality
gave two justifications for its variation from this principle. First, the
Court contended that the "paramount obligation of neutrality" was
not violated because the ordinance did not restrict the location of
the theatres solely because of the particular movie's point of view. 8
Second, the plurality deemed sexually explicit erotic expression to
be of "lesser" value than other protected speech, particularly politi-
cal debate.59 To support this contention, Justice Stevens gave exam-
ples of unprotected speech to show that the first amendment is not
absolute. 0 Justice Stevens then cited several cases to illustrate that
"[e]ven within the area of protected speech, a difference in content
may require a different governmental response."" The Court's ex-
amples of speech whose content warranted less protection included
54. Id. at 71. Justice Stevens categorized this protected speech as outside the realm of
"ideas of social and political significance" and therefore not worthy of full protection. Id. at
61. Justice Powell did not accept the plurality's view on this point, but provided the fifth
vote for reversal of the lower court on a zoning theory. Id. at 73 (Powell, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 85-88 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 84 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
57. See text accompanying notes 44-52 supra.
58. 427 U.S. at 70. See also Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838-839 & n.10 (1976).
59. 427 U.S. at 70. Justice Powell joined all but this part of the plurality opinion;
Justices White, Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger joined in the entire opinion.
60. Id. at 66 nn.23-24. See, e.g., Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 133-34 (1966) (speech
involving incitation to crime); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (inci-
tation to violence by "fighting words"); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (publica-
tion in time of war of the number and location of troops).
61. 427 U.S. at 66.
1979]1 1385
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [
libel," commercial speech," a captive audience on public rapid
transit systems," and materials that are obscene only when distrib-
uted to juveniles but not to adults. 5 The plurality, applying a bal-
ancing test, thus ruled in favor of the city on the ground that the
ordinance's restriction on theatre location did not greatly inhibit
access to protected sexually explicit expression because the ordi-
nance left enough theatres to accommodate the viewing public."
The portion of Young asserting that some protected expression
has "less value" than others is clearly contrary to the equality of
ideas doctrine" and traditional first amendment jurisprudence. The
plurality applied a subjective popularity test to determine whether
the particular speech was worthy of full protection. The plurality's
test fails to recognize an important need for the first amend-
ment-the protection of speech that is offensive to the majority of
the community." Because a majority of the Court did not accept the
plurality's test," however, lower courts are not bound to follow this
potentially dangerous test. Thus, Young's influence on the Mosley,
Erznoznik, and absolute approaches to the construction of the
content neutrality doctrine is uncertain.
B. Protecting Children and the First Amendment
The protection of children is often offered as justification for
not complying with the commands of the first amendment. This
justification enables the Court to make special concessions and ex-
ercise a more subjective approach in cases that threaten to adversely
affect minors. Because of this subjectivity, the Court's utilization of
62. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
63. But see Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976).
64. E.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
65. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
66. 427 U.S. at 62-63.
67. See note 42 supra and accompanying text. Mr. Justice Harlan, also supporting this
doctrine, wrote that once the expression is deemed protected, it must be recognized that:
much linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function. . . . In fact, words
are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction
the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual
speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function which, practically speaking, may
often be the more important element of the overall message communicated.
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). Thus, Justice Harlan felt that particular words
chosen by a speaker must not be substituted for because the words have an emotive as well
as cognitive effect that the speaker intends to convey.
68. See Note, supra note 40, at 480. See also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 655-
56 (1968) (Douglas & Black, JJ., dissenting).
69. See notes 54 & 59 supra.
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this rationale varies according to society's current attitude toward
the role of parent and government in child development. One prob-
lem that is particularly susceptible to these changing attitudes is
how to resolve the conflict between the right of the government to
assist parents in protecting the child from something thought to be
harmful and the right of the child to be exposed to the diverse
expression of ideas.70
Since colonial times, society has excluded children from the
civil rights movements in this country because children were gener-
ally classified with "the adjudged lunatic" because they did not
"possess the faculty of forming a judgment on their own interests
. . . ." Statesman and philosopher John Locke explained this
premise in terms of capacity rather than age. Locke thought it
obvious that, unlike adults, children lacked a capacity of knowing
the law of reason. 72 Nature imposed an obligation upon parents to
nourish, protect, educate and influence the values of their children
to assure that they attain a mature and rational capacity. Children
were to be protected both from the improvident actions of others
and from themselves. 7 3
The prevalence of this protectionist attitude throughout our
country's growth is demonstrated by Justice Frankfurter's state-
ment that "[c]hildren have a very special place in life which law
should reflect. Legal theories and their phrasing in other cases read-
ily lead to fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to determi-
nation of a State's duty toward children."7 Locke acknowledged,
however, that this duty gave parents neither unlimited nor unbri-
dled power to control or dispose of their children's lives and liber-
ties. He felt that, regardless of age, once sufficient capacity had
been developed discrimination against a child because of physical
immaturity was no longer justified.
Traditionally, courts have regarded parental power as virtually
absolute-prevailing over the claims of the state, other outsiders,
70. See generally Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some
Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights," 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV. 05.
71. H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 164 (1st American ed. 1864).
72. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 59 (1948). Accord, J. MILL,
ON LIBERTY 11 (1975). The law assumes capacity is essential as is evidenced by restrictions
on the freedom of children to marry, vote, drive, or enter contracts and other binding deci-
sions.
More recently, Justice Blackmun recognized the role of capacity as he acknowledged that
the state has somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults.
He concluded, however, that a competent, mature minor has a right to make personal choices
notwithstanding parental authority. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976).
73. J. LOCKE, supra note 72, at § 58.
74. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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and the children themselves unless there exists some compelling
justification for interference15 such as abandonment, neglect, abuse,
or some other action that threatens the health or safety of the child.
The Supreme Court adopted this view by establishing a strong pre-
sumption in favor of parental control over state intervention." Al-
though the parent has primary authority, this authority may be
delegated to the state to carry out parental objectives." One com-
mentator queried whether these cases "mean that parents have a
constitutionally sanctioned role in their children's lives," or whether
they "mean that the state has a constitutionally limited role in child
rearing that typically, but not necessarily, is enforced by deference
to parents?" 8 Many cases approach this question from the stand-
point of enforcing the parents' constitutional rights or permitting
the parent to assert the child's rights based upon societal prefer-
ences. This approach often necessitates constitutional limitations
on the state's role in child rearing. For example, in Pierce v. Society
of Sisters,79 the Court, in striking down a compulsory education
statute that in effect prevented private school attendance, stated
that children are not mere wards of the state, but are the responsi-
bility of parents who have the right and the obligation to prepare
the child for his place in society. Similarly, in Meyer v. Nebraska,"0
the Court, invalidating a Nebraska state statute that prohibited
foreign languages from being taught to young school children, held
that parents had the right to direct their children's education de-
spite the state's contention that good citizenship and patriotism
would be fostered by requiring that young children learn only Eng-
lish. In so holding, the Court also noted that if the state attempted
to completely replace the family in its child rearing capacity, it
would do "violence to both letter and spirit of the Constitution.""
The general principle enunciated in Pierce and Meyer was re-
stricted in Prince v. Massachusetts.8 2 The Prince Court upheld the
75. See In re Guardianship of Faust, 239 Miss. 299, 305-06, 123 So.2d 218, 220 (1960);
Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 132-33, 131 A. 198, 199 (1925); Hafen, supra note 70, at
619-26.
76. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
77. Parents have allowed the state to govern in areas such as child labor, public educa-
tion, and juvenile delinquent behavior. Hafen, supra note 70, at 618.
78. See Burt, Developing Constitutional Rights Of, In, and For Children, 39 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 118, 135 (Summer 1975).
79. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
80. 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
81. Id. at 402.
82. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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conviction of a child's guardian for violating the state's child labor
law statute. The guardian had taken the child, with her consent, to
sell Jehovah's Witness literature. Acknowledging the conflict be-
tween the state's interests and the "sacred private interests" of the
parents," the Court nevertheless held that the state, under its
parens patriae power, was obligated to limit parental authority in
order to protect children from potentially harmful public activity.4
The Court reasoned that the state's authority over children was
broader than its authority over adults, because, whereas parents
could make choices for themselves, children must possess the requi-
site capacity before making their own choices. 5
In Ginsberg v. New York," the Court upheld a New York stat-
ute prohibiting the sale of pornographic magazines to minors under
seventeen years of age, even though the magazines were not obscene
to adults. The Court reasoned that the restrictions were justified
because, first, parents have a constitutionally recognized claim of
authority to rear their children,8 7 and second, "[t]he state also has
an independent interest in the well-being of its youth."" Because
parental control over access to the magazines could not be assured,
the Court found that the second rationale justified banning distri-
bution of the material to children even though it was not obscene
to adults. This theory of "variable obscenity" demonstrates the dif-
ferent degrees of protection given to adults and minors. Ginsberg
also illustrates that both parents and the state have important in-
terests in protecting children.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder" the Court reaffirmed the principle that
parents have the primary interest in their children's welfare. The
Yoder Court, basing its holding on religious freedom and parental
rights to mold their children's values, excused children of the Amish
religion from compulsory school attendance after completion of the
eighth grade. Thus, after Yoder, it was clear that state interference
with parents' interests in raising their children, such as that in
Prince," would be justified only in the event of "harm to the physi-
83, The Court stated that "[ilt is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture
of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include prepara-
tion for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." Id. at 166.
84. Id. The Court listed compulsory school attendance and regulating child labor as
examples of this authority.
85. See id. at 170.
86. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
87. Id. at 639.
88. Id. at 640.
89. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
90. See notes 82-85 supra and accompanying text.
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cal or mental health of the child or to the public safety, peace, order,
or welfare"" or of "a potential for significant social burdens." 2
These cases demonstrate that parents traditionally have had
the primary responsibility for guiding children in the formation of
their values and protecting children from adverse influences. Par-
ents typically have enforced this responsibility by asserting both the
child's and the parent's constitutional rights. Within the last de-
cade, however, the Supreme Court, beginning with In re Gault, 1 has
approached several cases from the standpoint of the child's rather
than the parent's constitutional rights. The Gault Court, establish-
ing the precept that minors are to be afforded basic procedural due
process in juvenile court proceedings," determined that there is no
justification for treating minors differently than adults in the due
process context.
Gault, however, should not be interpreted more broadly than
the Court intended. Later decisions have clarified the majority's
position. Minority status is now considered to be a valid differentia-
tion. The Court, by guaranteeing minors certain constitutional
rights, has not conferred upon minors all the constitutional rights
that are conferred upon adults.15 Instead, minors are given only
those constitutional rights that protect them.
The Court has extended certain constitutional rights to chil-
dren in Brown v. Board of Education," In re Winship,"7 Goss v.
91. 406 U.S. at 230. As an example of when health and safety may be jeopardized, the
Court, citing In re Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978
(1964), suggested the giving of a blood transfusion to a Jehovah's witness against his consent.
406 U.S. at 230.
92. 406 U.S. at 234. In contrast, Justice Douglas, dissenting, insisted that the wishes
of the children must be considered. Id. at 245-46 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Only one of the
children stated that her religion required her to leave school after the eighth grade. Justice
Douglas dissented as to the other two children who had not testified. Id. at 243. (Douglas,
J., dissenting). Justice Douglas cited In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), West Va. State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), and Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969), for the proposition that children had been afforded the protections of the Bill of
Rights. Id. at 243-44. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
The Majority also suggested that a parental claim lacking explicit religious content
would command less deference. Id. at 235-36.
93. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
94. Id. at 13.
95. The Court has attempted to clarify its position by saying that it "has not yet said
that all rights constitutionally assured to an adult accused of crime . . . are . . . available
to the juvenile." McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 533 (1971). The McKeiver Court
refused to grant the right to trial by jury to juveniles in juvenile court proceedings because
that right did not provide a form of protection beneficial to minors in light of the paternalistic
attitude of the juvenile court.
96. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (applying the equal protection clause for school desegregation).
97. 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt required when a juvenile is
charged with an act that would be a crime if committed by an adult).
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Lopez, 8 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette" and
Tinker v. Des Moines School District.00 Tinker lends perhaps the
strongest support to the proposition that the Bill of Rights should
be extended uniformly to children. In Tinker the Court upheld the
first amendment rights of three students to wear black armbands
in sympathetic protest against the Vietnam War despite a school
order prohibiting such conduct. The majority stated that
"[s]tudents in school as well as out of school are 'persons' under
our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which
the State must respect." 0 Without further elaboration, it is unclear
whether the Court meant that "fundamental" rights extended to
children without qualification. Dissatisfaction with this expansive
language led Justice Stewart to conclude that he could not accept
that such rights are coextensive with those of adults. Indeed, Justice
Stewart cited Ginsberg v. New York as establishing that children
and adults do not have the same constitutional rights."o2 To Justice
Stewart there was no question that a state could precisely delineate
areas in which a child is "not possessed of that full capacity for
choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guaran-
tees.""0 ' Justice Stewart apparently felt that the recognition of stu-
dents' free speech rights in Tinker was not equivalent to granting
minors full constitutional power because the exercise of such rights
did not require assumption of binding obligations such as voting,
marriage or contracting. These activities would still require a mini-
mum age.
Tinker also may be distinguished as representing another par-
ental rights decision because the parents encouraged their children
to wear the armbands and were instrumental in the ensuing litiga-
tion. Thus, although the Court has extended some constitutional
rights to minors, these rights have been those that afford the minor
protection and therefore arguably can be supported by both the
parents' and the state's interest, leaving intact the basic presump-
tion of legal incapacity of minors.
98. 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (requiring notice and an opportunity for a hearing before being
suspended from school).
99. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). In Barnette, a majority of the Court affirmed the validity of
protecting the freedom of worship of children, id. at 642, and held that state compulsion of
Jehovah's Witnesses to salute the flag was unconstitutional. Justices Black and Douglas,
concurring, agreed that the teenage children had standing to claim first amendment protec-
tion. Id. at 643-44 (Douglas & Black, JJ., concurring).
100. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
101. Id. at 511.
102. Id. at 515 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Accord, Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565, 590-91 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting). See notes 86-88 supra and accompanying text.
103. 393 U.S. at 515 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968)).
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Further defining the boundaries of first amendment protection
for minors, the Court, in Rowan v. United States Post Office, "I
upheld a federal statute that allowed an addressee to forbid delivery
of sexually provocative mail to his home. The majority, asserting
that a man's home is his castle, held that a homeowner should be
protected from the risk of unwanted offensive material coming into
his children's hands through the mail. 0 Justice Brennan, however,
argued that the right of a mailbox holder to be taken off the mailing
list might properly be restricted in order to protect the rights of
minors who also used that mailbox."10 Although recognizing the need
for privacy and the right not to be an unwilling captive in one's
home, Justice Brennan believed that the head of the household
should not make the decision for everyone living there.o'0 Reflected
in Justice Brennan's opinion is the growing emphasis in first amend-
ment analysis on the minor's right to know."' In dealing with the
right to know, the emphasis is not on a person's age,' but on his
capacity to engage in meaningful discussion and his ability to use
the information in a way protected by the first amendment."o Jus-
tice Douglas, in his Yoder dissent,"' insisted that the proper inquiry
was the extent to which young persons may invoke first amendment
protection. It is uncontroverted that parental authority to control
and mold a child's attitudes should take precedence during a
minor's early years before independent, mature and rational
104. 397 U.S. 728 (1970). The Court reasoned that the sender's right to communicate
was outweighed by the right of an individual to keep objectionable material out of his home.
Id. at 737-38. Rowan held that the right to privacy included the right of the addressee to refuse
objectionable mail.
105. Id. at 738.
106. Id. at 741 (Brennan, J., concurring).
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Minarcini v. Strongville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 580-83 (6th Cir.
1976) (school board may not remove novels from school library if it impairs student's right
to receive information). Accord, Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F.
Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978). See Meiklejohn, The Reconciliation of First Amendment Free-
doms with Local Control Over the Moral Development of Minors, 12 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1205
(1978); cf. Note, First Amendment-Free Speech: Right to Know-Limit of School Board's
Discretion in Curricular Choice-Public School Library as Marketplace of Ideas, 27 CASE W.
REs. L. REV. 1034, 1055 (1977) (public school students capable of dealing with controversial
subjects).
109. Cf. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957) (Michigan statute prohibiting distribu-
tion of sexually explicit material to adults because of potential adverse effect on children
would reduce population to reading only what is fit for children).
110. The right to receive information has long been accorded constitutional protection.
See Kleindeinst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-65 (1972) (first amendment rights of public as
listeners); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1969) (rights of viewers
to receive balanced views on subject of public interest outweighed business interest).
111. See note 92 supra.
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thought is present. The question is when does an individual attain
this level of development. Although the answer is uncertain, some
psychologists maintain that by age fourteen children approach the
moral and intellectual maturity of an adult.112 Irrespective of the
particular age, such evidence suggests that the first amendment
mandate of free expression precludes the exclusion of minors from
the entire realm of free discussion. Furthermore, prohibiting a
minor from taking part in the free exchange of information could
foreseeably hinder the youth's powers of unconstrained, indepen-
dent thought, leaving him inadequately prepared to enter the world
with adult responsibilities of open discussion and judgments.
The importance of first amendment protection in promoting
the right to know has been acknowledged in several recent lower
court decisions. In one case, the Sixth Circuit prohibited a school
board from removing novels from the school library, holding such
removal to be an unconstitutional invasion of the students' right to
know."3 A federal district court in New York also recently held that
a state's prohibition against promoting, selling, distributing, or dis-
seminating sexual material to a child was an overbroad infringe-
ment of first amendment rights because it prevented children's ac-
cess to certain sex education material."4 Although acknowledging
legitimate state interests, the court found that, because of the non-
obscene nature of the publications, the statute did not provide the
least drastic means of effectuating its objective.">
One commentator has expressed concern about the fate of chil-
dren and the family should the Court go beyond its present bounds
and allow minors more constitutional rights than those that merely
provide protection."' The argument is that children lack the capac-
ity of adults and have a right to the nurture and protection of par-
ents in order to fulfill special psychological and emotional needs
until they attain maturity and independence. "Liberating" the chil-
dren may destroy the family and be to the ultimate detriment of
children if policies that restrict parental prerogatives are enforced.
These policies could create a noncommittal parental attitude if par-
ents no longer have the obligation and right to direct their children.
Should this parental withdrawal result, the argument concludes,
112. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 245 n.3 (citing D. ELKIND, CHILDREN AND
ADOLESCENTs 75-80 (1970); W. KAY, MORAL DEVELOPMENT 172-83 (1968); J. PIAGET, THE MORAL
JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (1948)).
113. 541 F.2d at 582-83.
114. St. Martin's Press, Inc. v. Carey, 440 F. Supp. 1196, 1207 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
115. Id. at 1205-07.
116. Hafen, supra note 70, at 651-56.
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child-rearing will be left to the state, which has proven to be less
than successful in rearing children." 7 Minors would truly be aban-
doned to their rights.
C. Analysis
It is clear that a conflict exists between rights to protect chil-
dren and first amendment principles. Using the facts of Pacifica as
illustrative of this conflict brings these disparate theories more viv-
idly into focus. Disregarding the unique characteristics of broad-
casting," the Pacifica Court seems to have reached a conclusion
completely contrary to first amendment jurisprudence.
The Court gave little weight to the presumptive unconstitu-
tionality of content discriminations and made no attempt to apply
either Mosley's strict scrutiny analysis or the rigorous balancing test
of Erznoznik.n' Arguably, the FCC's Pacifica Order would have
passed neither of these tests. Justice Stevens' plurality opinion in
Pacifica appears to have reaffirmed his unfortunate view in Young
concerning the "lesser" value of sexually-explicit expression. 2" The
opinion also resurrected the bifurcated Young theory of first amend-
ment subjectivity based upon whether the content and the context
of the particular expression has a higher or lower value. The plural-
ity apparently found that the offensive speech broadcast by WBAI-
FM merited only the lesser level of protection. As the dissent
argued, this view threatens to "unstitch the warp and woof of First
Amendment law."I21
Justice Stevens' view, however, has been expressly disclaimed
by a majority of the Court. In both Pacifica and Young those Jus-
tices that otherwise concurred in the result dissented as to the more
controversial aspect of Justice Stevens' opinions. 122The justification
offered by Justice Stevens-that the FCC does not object to the
point of view of Carlin but to the way he expresses itl23-iS clearly
the antithesis of the first amendment reasoning that the Court artic-
ulated in Cohen v. California: "we cannot indulge the facile as-
117. Id. at 655, citing Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A
Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 992-1000 (1975).
118. The broadcasting effects in a situation similar to that of Pacifica will not immedi-
ately be discussed. For these effects see Part IV infra.
119. See notes 44-52 supra and accompanying text.
120. 438 U.S. at 746-48; see note 54 supra and accompanying text.
121. 438 U.S. at 775 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
122. 438 U.S. at 761-62 (Powell & Blackmun, JJ.); id. at 762 (Brennan & Marshall,
JJ.); 427 U.S. at 73 n.1 (Powell, J.); id. at 86 (Stewart, Brennan, Marshall, & Blackmun,
iJ.).
123. 438 U.S. at 743 n.18 (Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C.J., & Rehnquist, J.).
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sumption that one can forbid particular words without also running
a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process."'
Thus, the question remains whether, if protected speech cannot
be constitutionally regulated on the basis of its content without
meeting careful scrutiny, it may be so regulated to protect children
in the listening audience. The Pacifica Court, although refusing to
hold the monologue obscene, nevertheless banned the communica-
tion because of its potential degrading and harmful effects upon
children.125 The majority upheld the Order's interference with pro-
tected expression because the government has an interest in the
"well being of its youth" and in supporting parental authority in
their own household.'2
The Pacifica Court's view is consistent with Ginsberg's recogni-
tion that the government has the right to aid parents in protecting
their children from commercialized appeals to prurient interest.
The Ginsberg majority's standard, however, was much less stringent
than traditional first amendment analysis, requiring only that there
be no evidence that the statute is not rationally related to the objec-
tive of safeguarding minors. Pacifica's broadcast obviously differs
because it was not a commerical appeal to prurient interests but
rather an intellectual program discussing society's attitudes toward
language. Under the Ginsberg "variable" standard, 2 1 such a broad-
cast could be deemed unprotected as obscene in the given context.
The Pacifica Court, however, failed to even mention this "variable
obscenity" theory to justify its result.
Even acknowledging the parents' right to bring up their chil-
dren safe from harmful influences 28 and the state's interest in the
welfare of those children, 2 9 courts should not ignore traditional first
amendment doctrines. Indeed, the Ginsberg dissent advocated the
standard absolutist position-that the first amendment forbids cen-
sorship even when the communication may result in harm.'" Jus-
tices Black and Douglas go so far, in that dissent, as to deny the
124. 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). See note 67 supra and accompanying text. Justice Harlan
further stated in Cohen that "verbal tumult" and "offensive utterance" are "in truth neces-
sary side effects of the broader enduring values which the process of open debate permits us
to achieve." 403 U.S. at 24-25.
125. 438 U.S. at 749-51.
126. Id. at 749 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968)). See notes
87-88 supra and accompanying text.
127. Whether the "average person" element of the Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973) standard will impair Ginsberg's variable formulation remains undecided.
128. See Part E1(B) supra.
129. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
130. Id. at 652-53 (Douglas & Black, JJ., dissenting).
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validity of the adult-minor distinction, arguing that the first
amendment was designed to protect that communication which
would otherwise be censored because it was harmful.' Justices
Black and Douglas reasoned that one could be corrupted or led into
delinquent behavior by hearing certain expressions regardless of
one's age. The dissenters sympathized with parents who were con-
cerned about their children's exposure to possibly harmful material,
but determined that there is a crucial difference between acceptable
parental involvement and censorship by the state.3 2 The dissent
also found that censorship necessarily implied a limitless subjective
impostion of one's tastes upon others whether it be by the state or
by a court.133
The Ginsberg dissent is based on the premise expressed in
Tinker that minors should be able to take part in free and open
exchange of independent thoughts. This approach, buttressed by
the view that capacity rather than age should be determinative,3 1
gives mature minors the right to know and be stimulated into inde-
pendent thinking by the free exchange of ideas with others.' So-
ciety as well as the minor benefits from the increased maturity and
capacity for original thought gained through exposure to different
ideas and attitudes. Moreover, a parent, although in the minority,
might want his child exposed to all communication to give him a
well rounded view of society. There is no guarantee that parents will
side with the state in these so-called protectionist policies.
A workable analysis for cases in which rights of child protection
are asserted against the first amendment would recognize that state
restrictions should be upheld if they are designed to protect children
in making binding and permanent decisions such as marriage and
voting until such time as the minor is clearly competent to express
his views and fully understand the consequences of his undertaking.
For other decisions, parental upbringing and nurturing remains very
important to the minor's growth and development. This develop-
ment is likely to be influenced by the expression with which the
child comes in contact. The state should not be permitted to regu-
late otherwise protected expression for the purpose of safeguarding
minors from expression it regards as harmful. Parents would be able
to decide how their child is to be raised and to allow their child to
be exposed to as little or as much expression as they feel he has the
131. Id. at 655-56. (Douglas & Black, JJ., dissenting).
132. Id. at 655.
133. Id. at 656.
134. See note 71, 72, 108, & 108 supra and accompanying text.
135. See notes 110-14 supra and accompanying text.
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capacity to absorb. The child's right to know and receive informa-
tion would also be protected from state interference.
The Pacifica Court held that government could help parents
protect their children from offensive language even though other
parents who perceived the language to be educational rather than
offensive might want their child exposed to the communication.
Justice Stevens' opinion could be construed as allowing the govern-
ment to act as a parent rather than merely to aid parents, in keeping
harmful language from. children. Justice Brennan, however, ob-
served that this deprives minors of first amendment rights, citing
Erznoznik for the principle that protected speech "cannot be sup-
pressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images that a
legislative body thinks is unsuitable for them."' If legislatures or
government agencies were allowed to exempt certain speech from
first amendment protection without articulating any workable stan-
dards, these statutes could foreseeably be changed with every in-
coming legislature. These statutes could also vary as applied to
different types of material depending on whether the legislators
subjectively felt that the material was harmful. Besides being argu-
ably unconstitutional, there would be massive additional amounts
of legislation or agency action spelling out whether certain expres-
sion in a specific context is or is not permissible.
The Pacifica Court's approval of the FCC's channeling plan as
an appropriate mode of regulation is also inconsistent with tradi-
tional first amendment jurisprudence. Because the plan merely
mandates that Carlin's monologue be broadcast at a time when
there are fewer children in the audience, the plan fails to protect all
children. If the state's interest in protecting children from this
speech is sufficient to justify abridging the first amendment, then
the plan adopted should achieve that interest. The only means to
adequately achieve that interest would be to ban the monologue
totally from being broadcast. By settling for less than such a ban,
the Pacifica Court unnecessarily abridged first amendment princi-
ples without achieving the goal that purportedly justified such
abridgment.
Thus, it is clear that the protect-the-children rationale, as ar-
ticulated in Pacifica, is inconsistent with traditional first amend-
ment analysis. Much of the Pacifica opinion, however, stresses the
additional factor of broadcasting and its unique accessibility to chil-
dren as justifying the FCC's Order. This Note will now examine
136. 438 U.S. at 768. (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (citing Erznoznik v. Jack-
sonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1975)).
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whether this additional factor justifies government regulation of
speech to protect children.
IV. THE EFFECT OF BROADCASTING ON THE FIRST
AMENDMENT-PROTECTION OF CHILDREN DICHOTOMY
Courts have consistently distinguished broadcasting from the
press 37 when confronted with the mandate of the first amend-
ment. 3 This distinction was first enunciated in Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, 13 in which the Court upheld the "fairness doc-
trine," which requires broadcasters to provide adequate and fair
coverage to those with opposing points of view on controversial sub-
jects. As one commentator noted, "instead of scrutinizing govern-
ment regulation of broadcasting in light of the print media cases and
our traditional reservations about government oversight of the
press, the Court in Red Lion regarded broadcasting as a 'unique
medium' that needed a distinctive first amendment analysis."4 u
Although the Court recognized that broadcasting is protected by
first amendment standards, 4 1 it reasoned that those standards
might differ because of broadcasting's particular characterisitics.
The Court interpreted the first amendment to guarantee that
government may not interfere with newspaper content in Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.I42 In Tornillo the same "fairness
137. See Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial
Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MIcH. L. REV. 1 (1976).
During the past half century there have existed in this country two opposing constitu-
tional traditions regarding the press. On the one hand, the Supreme Court has accorded
the print media virtually complete constitutional protection from attempts by govern-
ment to impose affirmative controls such as access regulation. On the other hand, the
Court has held affirmative regulation of the broadcast media to be constitutionally
permissible, and has even suggested that it may be constitutionally compelled. . . .
[Tihe Court in one context has insisted on the historical right of the editor to be free
from government scrutiny, but in the other it has minimized the news director's freedom
to engage in 'unlimited private censorship.'
Id. at 1, (citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)).
138. The first amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "Congress shall make no law
. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONsT. amend. I. Judges and
journalists tend to vary as to the interpretation of this amendment. Journalists perceive it as
absolute and prefer to read it in a vacuum, whereas judges find it somewhat ambiguous and
weigh its requirements against other rights and duties found in the Constitution. See H.
SIMoNs & J. CALIFANO, JR., THE MEDIA AND THE LAW 1 (1976).
139. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
140. Bollinger, supra note 137, at 6.
141. See, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948). Any
argument that first amendment protection extends only to speech that is informational on
its face, such as political discussions, but not to entertainment, was rejected in Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952).
142. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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doctrine" that was upheld as to broadcasters in Red Lion was
deemed an unconstitutional invasion of the first amendment when
applied to print media. The Tornillo Court, however, ignored Red
Lion and its apparent inconsistencies. This diverse treatment has
led media authorities to conclude that the two decisions imply that
print media fully qualifies for first amendment protection while the
broadcast media does not."'
Many arguments have been presented by courts and the FCC
to justify increased regulation of broadcasting. The "unique" char-
acteristics that purportedly set broadcast media apart from print
media include: First, the means of broadcast communications are
publicly owned and are part of the public domain administered in
trust for the public interest; second, the use of the airwaves is a
privilege rather than a vested right; third, electronic media are
uniquely influential and pervasive; and last, the number of avail-
able channels is finite due to scarcity of spectrum space.'"
A. Scarcity of Spectrum Space
The scarcity of channels doctrine was first articulated by Jus-
tice Frankfurter in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States'" in
which he stated: "Unlike other modes of expression, radio inher-
ently is not available to all. That is its unique characterisitic, and
that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to govern-
mental regulation."" This theory rests upon the assumption that
technical and economic limitations on providing an infinite number
of frequencies necessitate governmental allocation of those available
frequencies in order to promote first amendment goals of diverse
expression and an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.4 7 Government
assignment of frequencies must be done on a rational basis in ac-
cordance with Congress' "public interest" standard. After FCC
143. The Court has recently reaffirmed the double standard in FCC v. National Citi-
zens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978), finding contentions that cross-ownership
rules violated the Constitution untenable because the argument "ignores the fundamental
proposition that there is no 'unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable
to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish.'" Id. at 799 (citing Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969)).
144. See Robinson, supra note 10, at 151.
145. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
146. Id. at 226.
147. In Red Lion, note 139 supra and accompanying text, the Court stated: "Where
there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to
allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable
to the right of every citizen to speak, write, or publish." 395 U.S. at 388.
148. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1976). The FCC may promulgate guidelines to illustrate what
programming practices it deems to be in the public interest. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082,
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review of the applicant's programming practice, the FCC will grant
or renew those licenses that most benefit the public interest.'"
The validity of the scarcity rationale has been the subject of
much debate. Critics of the rationale point out that the first amend-
ment guarantee of a free press is not tantamount to a guarantee of
a free and numerous press and that the relatively limited number
of newspapers has not led to regulation of print media.' In fact,
many more radio and television stations exist than newpapers. If
there indeed were a scarcity, it could be remedied by expansion of
cable television and UHF, both of which have unlimited channel
capability. These critics assert that regulation and constant obser-
vation by the FCC inhibits coverage of controversial points of view,
which in turn hinders rather than helps a free marketplace of ideas.
Although the scarcity rationale is less persuasive with the ad-
vent of cable television, UHF and other technological improve-
ments, it is nevertheless foreseeable that a surplus of potential
broadcasters would compel the government to choose applicants
based upon the amount and quality of past or proposed "public
interest" programming. This justification, however, would apply to
regular, periodic evaluations of a broadcaster's overall performance
in providing public interest programming rather than examination
of specific broadcasts for certain words. Daily policing of broadcasts
would not appear to be the perfect balance between the public inter-
est in decent programming and first amendment commands.
The Supreme Court has stressed the importance of editorial
discretion in programming decisions, holding that self-restraint
should be achieved through the editor's judgment rather than from
immediate, constant oversight by the FCC.' In maintaining the
spirit of free editorial choice, the FCC should be limited to periodic,
post hoc evaluation of broadcasters' use or misuse of allocated air
space rather than scrutiny of specific broadcasts for particular of-
1095 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
149. Notwithstanding the broad powers granted to the FCC, Congress did not authorize
the FCC to regulate or license broadcasters "upon the basis of their political, economic or
social views, or upon any other capricious basis." 319 U.S. at 226.
150. See Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE L.J.
213, 218-34.
151. See the discussion of Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp.
1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976), at Part V infra. In Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973), the Court stated: "For better or worse, editing is what
editors are for; and editing is selection and choice of material. That editors-newspaper or
broadcast-can and do abuse this power is beyond doubt, but that is no reason to deny the
discretion Congress provided." Id. at 124-25. For a discussion of this case and its emphasis
on editorial autonomy, see B. ScHanr, JR., FREEDOM OF THE PRESS VS. PUBLIc AccEss 174-82
(1976).
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fensive words, as in Pacifica. This scrutiny tends to constrain edi-
torial discretion to a greater extent than is allowed by the first
amendment.
B. The Pervasiveness of the Broadcasting Medium and its
Accessibility to Children
Two aspects of broadcasting, its pervasive presence in Ameri-
can lives and its unique accessibility to children, were of paramount
importance to the Supreme Court in Pacifica, prompting the Court
to assert that "of all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that
has received the most limited First Amendment protection." 52 Jus-
tice Stevens' words might be construed to suggest the questionable
proposition that broadcasting is subject to regulation that is imper-
missible when applied to other media simply because it is the most
effective form of communication. That proposition, which seem-
ingly turns first amendment values upside down when read in con-
text, is actually addressed at the fact that the broadcast media
penetrates the privacy of the home.
When addressing the pervasiveness-privacy justification, the
Court went beyond its previous generalizations about the home
being the one place in which people have a right to be unassaulted
by uninvited, offensive sights and sounds.153 In public one may be
required to avert one's eyes to avoid offensive but protected mes-
sages so that others may remain free to exercise their first amend-
ment rights.' In the home, however, it is unnecessary for one to be
burdened so that others might enjoy protected speech. 55 The
152. 438 U.S. at 748.
153. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975); Cohen v. Califor-
nia, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971); Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
154. The Court in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), ruled that a strongly worded
message on the back of defendant's jacket could not be constitutionally restrained because
offended viewers could simply avert their eyes to avoid the offensive message. Similarly, in
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975), the Court found governmental re-
straint of nudity on a drive-in movie screen visible from the public streets to be improper
because eye aversion was available. But see Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50
(1976). Cohen's test for whether speech may be proscribed "solely to protect others from
hearing it" was whether "substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially
intolerable manner." 403 U.S. at 21.
When someone is a captive and unable to avoid the offensive sight or sound, such as
someone either riding on a city bus or subjected to sound amplifiers in public places, the
speech may be constitutionally restricted. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298
(1974); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). Thus, there are varying degrees of captivity,
and in every case the extent of captivity must be measured and the interest of the audience
balanced against the value of tolerating the expression and the benefits of avoiding govern-
mental regulation of the message.
155. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970); Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557 (1969). See notes 104-07 supra and accompanying text.
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Pacifica Court agreed with the FCC's conclusion that the home
listener should not be put to even the minimal momentary discom-
fort of enduring offensive speech while changing the channel or turn-
ing off the set because the Court deemed this discomfort sufficient
to override the interests of other listeners who wanted to hear the
afternoon monologue and who might not have been able to hear it
at another time. The Court reasoned that once the offensive speech
was heard, the harm was done and that warnings could not remedy
the possible injury because, unlike a book or movie which can have
warnings on its cover or marquee, the nature of broadcasting is such
that warnings given at the beginning of the broadcast could not
warn those subsequently tuning in.'
The Court's use of this pervasive-quality-of-broadcasting justi-
fication seems to ignore several arguments. First, although an indi-
vidual is entitled to substantial privacy rights in his home, this
interest should lessen when one affirmatively invites communica-
tion into the home through radio or television. Because the airwaves
are a public medium, one who turns on his radio or television is as
effectively entering the public domain as one who walks onto the
street. Second, although the Court in Rowan protected the individ-
ual addressee's right to bar offensive mail from his mailbox, banning
certain broadcasts from the airwaves has a much more harsh effect
on first amendment guarantees. In the latter case, the ban iot only
protects the offended listener but also imposes his preferences on
others who were not offended and who desired the free exchange of
communication. Third, like the unwilling observers in Cohen and
Erznoznik who could avert their eyes when confronted by an offen-
sive message," sensitive listeners could remedy the pervasiveness
of the medium by merely changing stations or turning the radio off.
The slight degree of offensiveness to which one is subjected until one
can turn the dial seems a small price for free expression."'
In Rowan, the Court stated that it made no sense to say "that
a radio or television viewer may not twist the dial to cut off an
offensive . . . communication and thus bar its entering his
156. 438 U.S. at 748-49.
157. See note 154 supra and accompanying text.
158. As a compromise between offensive language and the first amendment one scholar
proposed the general rule that "the law should not attempt to insulate any persons in our
society, no matter how willing or unwilling an audience they may be, from the initial impact
of any kind of communication, but that the law should protect their right to escape from a
continued bombardment by that communication if they wish to be free from it." Haiman,
Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not to be Spoken To?, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 153, 193 (1972)
(emphasis in original).
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home.""' Although the majority in Pacifica found this alternative
unacceptable,' such a holding would be more in line with first
amendment jurisprudence than a total prohibition excluding those
listeners who did not find the broadcast offensive. Indeed, "in what
otherwise might seem a trifling and annoying instance of individual
distasteful abuse of a privilege . . . fundamental societal values are
truly implicated."' 6' Furthermore, the use of pre- and mid-
broadcast warnings could considerably lessen the likelihood of even
these few offensive moments.
The alternative and more persuasive rationale for regulation
given by many courts is broadcasting's unique accessibility to chil-
dren. As this Note concluded in Part III, protection of children,
without more, is an insufficient justification for completely circum-
venting the first amendment. It is contended, however, that the
additional element of broadcasting's unique characteristics provides
the additional factor enabling this rationale to withstand constitu-
tional challenge.
Broadcasting is significantly more accessible to children than
is print media because unlike print media, which requires the con-
sumer's purchase of each publication, a radio or television, once
purchased by a household, provides a variety of broadcasts to chil-
dren at no additional cost.'" The only additional burden is turning
it on and selecting the channel. The cash needed to purchase books
and magazines, however, tends to limit children's access as does the
vendor's ability to selectively choose those to whom he distributes
the material. Broadcasting provides neither of these safeguards.
Moreover, parents may be unable to control what their children
view or hear because radios and televisions are comparatively im-
mobile and thus cannot be easily removed from children's proximity
as can printed material. Additionally, with increasing numbers of
parents working during the day, children left at home cannot be
relied upon to switch channels should the material become offen-
sive. Thus, it is argued that governmental regulation is needed to
aid parents in supervising their children.
It is also contended that children, as a passive audience, are
analogous to the captive audience and thus warrant more protection
than adults. When persons are "captive"-physically unable to
159. 397 U.S. at 737.
160. See note 156 supra and accompanying text.
161. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. at 25.
162. As Judge Leventhal noted in Pacifica at the Court of Appeals level, "[riadio is
relatively inexpensive in initial capital cost, and a virtually free good in terms of operating
expense." 556 F.2d at 34.
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avoid the offensive speech being exercised by another-courts have
held that the speech may be consitutionally restrictzd. 3 The ration-
ale for this "captive" exception is that these persons are unable to
exercise the free choice presumed to be the basis of first amendment
guarantees.8 4 Similarly, it is argued that offensive speech may be
constitutionally regulated when children are likely to be in the audi-
ence because children lack full capacity to engage in independent,
free expression and make deliberate choices whether to receive such
speech."' Children are thus assumed to be more likely to accept the
message articulated by radio or television because of the combina-
tion of their immaturity and the dramatic and immediate nature of
the medium."'
As discussed in Part II, one must ascertain who is being pro-
tected by regulation of offensive speech because statistics show that
children as young as fourteen are fully capable of accepting free
expression.17 Because the degree of "captivity" is relative to the age
and maturity of the child, the older the child the more likely he is
to have the maturity to make the decision whether to change the
channel. The degree of harm to this child is probably slight since
he can change the channel quickly if he is unwilling to hear the
message. Moreover, it is arguable that a school age child could
change the channel just as easily as he could walk away from offen-
sive language spoken by other children at school. A younger child,
with less capacity and therefore more susceptibility, would, of
course, warrant greater protection."' Such a child, however, proba-
bly will not be left totally unsupervised so that he may turn on a
radio or television without someone being close enough to change
the channel. Furthermore, if he is young enough to merit full protec-
tion, he will probably be unharmed by the language because he
cannot fully understand what it means.
The Pacifica Court seems to have placed no discernible limits
upon the right of the FCC to ban offensive speech in order to protect
children. What the FCC subjectively deems offensive remains for
163. See note 154 supra and accompanying text.
164. See note 158 supra and accompanying text.
165. "[A] State may permissibly determine that, at least in some precisely delineated
areas, a child-like someone in a captive audience-is not possessed of that full capacity for
individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees." Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
166. Justice Jackson argued in Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 307-08 (1951), (Jack-
son, J., dissenting), that "[tihe vulnerability of various forms of communication to com-
munity control must be proportioned to their impact upon other community interests."
167. See note 113 supra and accompanying text.
168. See notes 109-12 supra and accompanying text.
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future determination, with the attendant possibility that a majority
of parents might not approve of the FCC's determination. This po-
tentially limitless discretion could justify a ban of great literary and
artistic works that contain words that, taken out of context, would
be offensive.
Therefore, it appears that the added element of broadcasting
does not justify tipping the balance in favor of abridging the first
amendment rights of adults and minors with sufficient capacity to
receive information judiciously in order to protect children who have
not attained this level of capacity. Parents rather than government
may best protect the latter. The parent may choose whether to
permit the child to listen to offensive broadcasts or to change the
channel. As discussed earlier, the same immature children that the
FCC seeks to protect probably will be supervised, if not by a parent,
by someone designated by a parent. Thus, the need for government
protection is not acute. In addition, channeling does not solve the
problem because significant numbers of children are likely to re-
main in the listening audience long after many adults have gone to
bed.16'
V. SELF-REGULATION OF BROADCASTERS TO PROTECT CHILDREN: THE
FAMHY VIEWING HouR
Censorship in the broadcast media is undeniable. Acknowledg-
ing Red Lion and its justifications of scarcity of the airwaves,
public trust, and pervasiveness of the medium,17 0 Congress em-
powered the FCC to safeguard the public interest in programming
and thus restricted broadcasters more than their print media
counterparts. Pursuant to this goal, the FCC, through its licensing
and other powers, ensures that broadcasting will never function
inconsistently with the "public convenience, interest, or necess-
ity."' Though forbidden to act as a censor, 7 2 the FCC, through its
licensing practices1 3 and rules and regulations directed at the sub-
169. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
170. See notes 139-40 & 144 supra and accompanying text.
171. The Communications Act of 1934 grants the FCC the power to regulate in the
"public convenience, interest, or necessity." 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1976).
172. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1976) provides in full:
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Commission
the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any
radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Com-
mission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio communica-
tion.
Id.
173. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1976). 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1976) governs the FCC's power to
renew licenses "if the Commission finds that the public interest, convenience, and necessity
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stantive content of broadcasting, has dramatic influence upon pro-
gram content. Due to the first amendment, the most comprehensive
censorship is achieved without formal government regulation. This
takes the form of elaborate self-imposed broadcast industry stan-
dards that the FCC encourages vigorously through warnings, veiled
threats of license revocation, and advisory letters."'
A week after issuance of the initial Pacifica order, 75 the FCC
made public its Report on the Broadcast of Violent, Indecent, and
Obscene Material.78 The report suggested an expansion of the Com-
mission's authority to ban indecent and obscene programming from
radio, television, and cable television. Broadcast indecency and ob-
scenity required "direct governmental action," and the FCC vowed
to "meet its responsibilities in this area." 77
Perhaps coincidentally, television networks simultaneously
opened their 1975 season with a new twist-the family viewing
hour."' This policy, which restricted program content during the
early evening hours, was adopted in part as a response to increasing
public concern about the effects of television on children. More
influential, however, was the interest of two other audiences-the
FCC and Congress. 79 The new policy took the form of an amend-
ment to the National Association of Broadcaster's [NAB] Televi-
sion Code, stating that,
[E]ntertainment programming inappropriate for viewing by a general family
audience should not be broadcast during the first hour of network entertain-
ment programming in prime time and in the immediately preceding hour. In
the occasional case when an entertainment program in this time period is
deemed to be inappropriate for such an audience, advisories should be used
to alert viewers. Advisories should also be used when programs in later time
periods contain material that might be disturbing to significant segments of
the audience. 0
The purpose of the family viewing hour was to prohibit the broad-
cast of sex and violence during the hours of 7:00 to 9:00 p.m."'
would be served thereby." See notes 147-49 supra and accompanying text.
174. See Note, Filthy Words, the FCC, and the First Amendment: Regulating Broad-
cast Obscenity, 61 VA. L. REv. 579, 605-06 (1975).
175. Pacifica Foundation, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 32 RAn. REG. 2d (P&F) 1331 (1975).
176. 51 F.C.C.2d 418, 32 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 1367 (1975).
177. Id. at 419, 32 RAD. REG. 2d at 1368-69.
178. This policy has also been called the "family hour," the "9:00 rule," and the "prime
time censorship rule." Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1072
(C.D. Cal. 1976).
179. See Note, It's All in the Family: Family Viewing and the First Amendment, 7
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 83 (1978).
180. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BRoADcAsTERs, THE TELEVISION CODE 2-3 (18th ed. 1975)
quoted in Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1072 (C.D. Cal.
1976).
181. Id.
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E.S.T. and to require all programs to be appropriate for general
family viewing.8 2
A. Rejection of Governmental Interference in Programming
Content: Writers Guild
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California dealt with an immediate challenge to the validity of the
family viewing hour policy in Writers Guild of America, West v.
FCC.' The court found that the family viewing hour policy, al-
though ostensibly self-regulation, was actually adopted as a direct
result of extreme pressure by the FCC rather than as an individual
decision by licensees, and therefore violated the first amendment.
Absent government interference, the decision by licensees would
have been "inherent to the broadcasting function and constitution-
ally protected."' The element of government coercion, however,
made the decision a violation of the first amendment.
Concern with potential harmful effects of television upon chil-
dren has been prevalent in the more than two decades since the
public originally voiced its discontent with programming to Con-
gress."' Extensive studies were made in the 1960's, and although
experts do not agree as to the precise effects of television content
on children of different developmental stages, there is consensus
that viewing does have a significant impact."' This impact can be
illustrated by actual time spent viewing this medium. It is esti-
mated that ninety-seven percent of all American households own
one or more television sets'17 and that television viewing averages
over seven hours each day per family." Pre-school children as young
as three years old become avid, regular viewers and, by the time
182. Id.
183. 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976). In the first suit, Writers Guild of America, the
Director's Guild of America, the Screen Actors Guild, and a number of independent creators,
writers, and producers, such as Norman Lear, filed a lawsuit against three major television
networks (ABC, NBC, and CBS), the NAB, the FCC, and the FCC Commissioners. Com-
plaint of Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. at 1-4. In a companion suit which was consoli-
dated with Writers Guild, Tandem Productions, Inc. sought $10,000,000 in damages against
CBS because "All in the Family" was moved out of its strategic 8:00 p.m. time slot allegedly
due to the family viewing hour policy. Tandem Prod., Inc. v. CBS, Inc. 423 F. Supp. 1064
(C.D. Cal. 1976).
184. 423 F. Supp. at 1064-65.
185. Id. at 1094.
186. TELEvISION AND GROWING UP: THE IMPACT OF TELEVISED VIOLENCE, REPORT TO THE
SURGEON FROM THE SURGEON GENERAL'S SciENTmIc ADVISORY COMMITrEE ON TELEvISION AND
VIOLENCE 24 (1972).
187. BROADCASTING YEARBOOK 1976, at C-300.
188. Stand-off at Van Deerlin's Session on TV Violence, BROADCASTING, March 7, 1977,
at 52.
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they graduate from high school, will have watched television twice
as long as they will have spent studying, and longer than anything
else other than sleeping."' Child psychologist Robert M. Liebert
maintains that television "has changed childhood more than any
other social innovation in the history of the world."' Thus, the high
degree of children's viewing more than justifies a close inquiry into
programming content and possible self-regulation by the broadcast
industry.
The public pressure on Congress that resulted from these stud-
ies on children and broadcasting led both the Senate"' and the
House of Representatives 9 2 to request that the FCC issue a report
on what it intended to do, within constitutional limits, to reduce
the large number of programs that were unsuitable for children. In
response, FCC Chairman Richard E. Wiley, asked the NAB to
strengthen its stand against television violence."' Although this re-
quest was rejected, it marked the first government attempt to inter-
fere with broadcast licensees' discretion in the area of programming
content. In the latter part of 1974, however, Chairman Wiley sought
and received proposals from his staff suggesting possible FCC action
to protect children from undesirable programming. These proposals
included issuance of policy statements, notice of inquiry, and pro-
posed rulemaking. 4 Rather than on formal measures, emphasis was
placed on jawboning."' In addition, industry self-regulation was to
be looked upon favorably as being consistent with the "public inter-
est" standard applied to licensees.'
Conscious of first amendment limitations upon formal govern-
ment action, Chairman Wiley attempted personal informal pressure
on the industry in the form of public speeches that called for indus-
try self-regulation, ' meetings with network executives," a proposal
189. Lublin, The Television Era: From Bugs to Batman, Children's TV Shows Produce
Adult Anxiety, Wall St. J., Oct. 19, 1976, a 1, col. 1 & 37, col. 1.
190. Id. at 37, col. 1.
191. S. REP. No. 1056, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1974).
192. H.R. REP. No. 1139, 93d Cong., 2d Sess 15 (1974).
193. 423 F. Supp. at 1096.
194. Id.
195. Jawboning is a form of moral suasion involving an appeal to industry spirit and
sometimes including vague threats. In this context, it refers to the great persuasive power of
the FCC over the individual licenses. See Note, supra note 179, at 90 & n.61.
196. 423 F. Supp. at 1096-97.
197. Id. at 1098, 1117-18, 1121. Typical of Chairman Wiley's personal lobbying and
veiled threats was his comment in a speech to the Illinois Broadcasters Association in which
he declared "[i]f self-regulation does not work, governmental action to protect the public
may be required-whether you like it or whether I like it." Id. at 1098.
198. Id. at 1098-99, 1122.
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of a joint statement by the networks on the subject of sex and
violence,'" and a suggestion that the NAB code express a new posi-
tion on this topic. 200 As a result, all three networks began work on
policy statements, consulting with FCC staff to determine what
provisions would satisfy both Wiley and the FCC.20 ' The NAB was
thought to be the appropriate body to formulate the new policy in
order to accomplish industry-wide compliance as well as to prevent
any competitive advantage a network might gain by refusing to
comply with the policy. 20 2
When the NAB Code Board met to discuss proposed amend-
ments to the Television Code, however, the primary focus was not
on the need to protect children from potentially harmful program-
ming, but rather on the possible consequences should the NAB fail
to act in a manner acceptable to the FCC.23 The NAB approved
amendments embodying the family viewing hour policy in time for
their inclusion in the FCC Report on the Broadcast of Violent, Inde-
cent, and Obscene Material.204 The report endorsed the NAB
amendments yet effectively sidestepped a direct confrontation with
the first amendment by stating: "Regulatory action to limit violent
and sexually-oriented programming which is neither obscene nor
indecent is less desirable than effective self-regulation, since
government-imposed limitations raise sensitive First Amendment
problems." 205
In April 1975, after more speeches, press releases, and meetings
with network officials, the Television Board of the NAB formally
adopted the family viewing hour policy as an amendment to its
Television Code.2" Although Chairman Wiley sought to characterize
his influence in the matter as personal, the court in Writers Guild
found it to be official in nature because there was persuasive cir-
cumstantial evidence that the Chairman "was acting on behalf of,
and with the approval of, the Commission." 20 7 The court held that
a licensee is free to adopt the family viewing hour policy if its deci-
sion is based on its independent judgment that the family viewing
hour policy is valuable in promoting the public interest. 28 Having
199. Id. at 1099.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1098-100.
202. Id. at 1094, 1100, 1108 n.63, 1110-11, 1125.
203. Id. at 1110-11.
204. 51 F.C.C.2d 418, 32 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 1367 (1975).
205. Id. at 420, 32 RAD. REG. 2d at 1370.
206. 423 F. Supp. at 1119.
207. Id. at 1120. A construction as official rather than personal is significant in a finding
that it was governmental restrictions that are prohibited by the first amendment.
208. Id. at 1130. This would apply "even if the source of the idea is governmental, and
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found governmental coercion by the FCC and its Chairman, how-
ever, the court invoked the first amendment, stating that: "[I]t is
clear that the adoption of the family viewing policy was caused
substantially by governmental pressure. The adoption of the policy
was not the kind of independent decision required by the First
Amendment. Instead the networks served in a surrogate role in
achieving the implementation of government policy."20
B. First Amendment Problems
The problems inherent in accommodating the first amendment
in the broadcasting context were stated ably by Judge J. Skelly
Wright:
[In] some areas of the law it is easy to tell the good guys from the bad
guys. . . . In the current debate over broadcast media and the First Amend-
ment . . . each debator claims to be the real protector of the First Amend-
ment, and the analytical problems are much more difficult than in ordinary
constitutional adjudication . . . the answers are not easy.210
The Writers Guild court carefully avoided the issue of the constitu-
tionality of the family viewing hour policy by stating that although
the desirability of the family viewing hour was not at issue, the
method of its adoption clearly was. The court found that program-
ming decisions must be made independently by broadcasters rather
than as a result of government coercion.21' The court characterized
the question as "who should have the right to decide what shall and
shall not be broadcast and how and on what basis should these
decisions be made." 212
It is doubtful that the FCC, using formal rulemaking proce-
dures, could constitutionally promulgate a family viewing hour rule
that prohibited sex and violence in programming during a certain
time period. Although it is uncontroverted that broadcasting's
unique characteristics merit regulation that would be intolerable in
other media, 23 the first amendment standard used for broadcasting
forbids complete censorship of programming content, 2 14 even for the
even if government officials have encouraged the policy." Id. Some network officials already
favored curbing the amount of sex and violence on television. This is evidenced by the
statement of one CBS official that "not only . .. [did CBS think] there was a problem, but,
in fact, they were already in the process of doing something about it." Id. at 1100.
209. Id. at 1140.
210. F. FRIENDLY, THE GooD GuYs, THE BAD GuYS AND THE FST AMENDMENT 198 (1975).
Judge Wright made this statement in a speech given before the National Law Center at
George Washington University in June 1973.
211. 423 F. Supp. at 1140.
212. Id. at 1072.
213. See notes 140-41 supra and accompanying text.
214. See CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 118 (1973); Farmers Educ.
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purpose of protecting children. Although Red Lion justifies broad
governmental regulation in the public interest, 2 15 such regulation is
not without limit.
In CBS Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, the Court
noted that "Congress intended to permit private broadcasting to
develop with the widest journalistic freedom consistent with its
public obligations. Only when the interests of the public are found
to outweigh the private journalistic interests of the broadcasters will
government power be asserted within the framework of the Act." 21
The CBS Court further stated that the licensee has broad discretion
in deciding how he will meet his obligation of public interest pro-
gramming. 217 The Writers Guild court also acknowledged the limita-
tions on the broad public interest standard, observing that although
the FCC has the power to regulate through the use of this standard,
"no roving power to screen out inappropriate material has been
tendered." 218 The court also noted that the FCC made the conces-
sion itself in policy statements.219
Drawing clear distinctions based upon program content is im-
permissible when the content sought to be censored during the fam-
ily viewing hour is protected by the first amendment, even though
it may be unsuitable for family viewing.220 Pacifica and Writers
Guild both seem to focus on this issue. Both cases present the prob-
lem of accommodating the first amendment and the regulation of
broadcasting: How far could the FCC go in regulating program con-
tent under the guise of assuring that licensees operate in the public
interest? In Writers Guild the court refused to allow regulation in
the name of the public interest to abridge the first amendment. As
this Note has shown, courts confronted with a Pacifica-type situa-
& Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 527-30 (1959); Sonderling Broadcasting Corp.,
41 F.C.C.2d 777, 784, 27 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 1508, 1517 (1973) ("This Commission has
consistently adhered to the Policy that it will not-indeed cannot-insist that licensees
abandon program material because it is offensive to some or even a substantial number of
listeners.")
215. See notes 139-40 supra and accompanying text.
216. 412 U.S. 94, 110 (1973).
217. Id. at 111.
218. 423 F. Supp. at 1147.
219. Id. (citing Children's Television Report and Policy Statement, 50 F.C.C. 2d 1, 3
(1974)i; see Report on the Broadcast of Violent, Indecent, and Obscene Material, 51 F.C.C.
2d 418, 418-20, 32 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 1367, 1368-70 (1975); Report and Statement of Policy
Re: Commission en banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303, 2313, 20 RAD. REG. (P&F)
1901, 1911-12 (1960). The facts in Writers Guild reveal that Chairman Wiley felt any formal
FCC intervention to be of questionable constitutionality. 423 F. Supp. at 1097 & n.39. This
is further evidenced by the fact that Wiley deliberately took the more arduous informal
coercion route rather than direct regulation.
220. See Part I1(A) supra.
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tion should reach the same conclusion.
It is arguable that the FCC could constitutionally impose a
family viewing hour if a direct correlation could be shown between
sex and violence on television and increased aggressive or violent
behavior in children to such a degree that it could be said to injure
public health.221 Because this correlation has never been demon-
strated,2 2 however, the first amendment prohibitions against cen-
sorship would seem to proscribe such a rule.
Thus, under this Note's analysis, an FCC imposed family view-
ing hour would violate the first amendment, even if imposed with
the purpose of protecting children. Those children who lack suffi-
cient capacity may be adequately supervised by their parents, and
those not so supervised arguably have the maturity and capacity to
make their own decisions concerning programming. The family
viewing hour policy obviously is concerned that children do not have
the capacity to make a mature choice whether to watch a particular
program. Thus, the policy places the power to determine what is
appropriate for children's viewing in the Code Board rather than the
family. Such a policy, like the Pacifica channeling plan, impairs
parents' rights to oversee their children's activities and choices.
Those parents desiring that their children be exposed to more ma-
ture themes on television would have their wishes thwarted by the
family viewing hour.
In the case of television, more protection may be afforded chil-
dren through the use of warnings both before broadcasts and during
commerical breaks. Moreover, new technology may allow the use of
channel locks to provide safeguards. 223 It has also been suggested
that a white dot be broadcast continuously in the upper corner of
the television screen during potentially harmful broadcasts so that
even an instant of offensiveness may be avoided.224 There are, there-
221. It is questionable in light of the first amendment whether even a showing of injury
to public health is sufficient to support a programming content regulation such as the family
viewing hour. Apart from the case of cigarette advertising in which regulation was justified
by harm to public health and traditionally low levels of protection given advertising, such a
justification is unprecedented. The district court, in upholding the cigarette advertising ban,
specifically stated that FCC regulation of programming content cannot be a broad ban of
anything which might conceivably be injurious to the public health, but must be drawn
narrowly to exclude only unprotected speech. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F.
Supp. 582, 585 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd mem. sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Kleindienst,
405 U.S. 1000 (1972). Thus, it appears that the public health rationale could not constitution-
ally justify congressional or FCC regulation such as the family viewing hour to limit expres-
sion. See Note, Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC: A First Amendment Blow to
FCC Jawboning, 20 Aiuz. L. REv. 315, 332-33 & n.130 (1978).
222. See note 186 supra and accompanying text.
223. See Note, note 10 supra, at n.97.
224. See Note, note 179 supra, at 105. FCC Chairman Wiley mentioned the use of the
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fore, many opportunities for the supervising parent or more mature
unsupervised child to be protected even if the communication is
found offensive.
Of course, if formal regulation by the government cannot be
achieved consonant with the first amendment, action by private
licensees resulting from informal coercion and pressure, if extreme
enough to be deemed equivalent to state' action, such as that in
Writers Guild, is also prohibited. Informal FCC influence on broad-
casters must be closely scrutinized by courts to determine when that
influence is tantamount to government action. Such action has a far
more insidious effect in chilling electronic media expression because
a licensee must repeatedly justify his programming decisions in re-
newing his license, and is usually all too willing to follow the guide-
lines and "suggestions" of the FCC concerning the kind of program-
ming that will be looked upon with favor. 2 5 A letter to the station
or even a call to the station's Washington counsel indicating concern
over a particular practice of the licensee quickly motivates policy
reconsideration. 228
Future courts should follow Writers Guild in prohibiting pro-
gramming decisions that in reality are direct results of agency coer-
cion rather than independent judgment. The courts should, how-
ever, go further and establish concrete standards by which to distin-
guish helpful from threatening "suggestions" so that the agency as
well as the licensee will know the boundaries. If the licensee makes
white dot during November 1974, but it was not pursued. 423 F. Supp. at 1099 n.44.
225. A former FCC Commissioner, Glen 0. Robinson describes the effect of the constant
review for license renewal:
The effectiveness of the renewal process in influencing a licensee's operations, in-
cluding his program operations, arises from two facts. First, the licensee has the burden
of coming forth . . . to show compliance with Commission standards and fulfillment of
prior promises; second, this process is routine and relatively frequent, thereby eliminat-
ing any doubt that the Commission will scrutinize the actual performance of the station
in relation to the performance promised.
Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of Radio and
Television Regulation, 52 MiNN. L. REv. 67, 119-20 (1967) (emphasis in original).
226. Another former FCC Commissioner described the process as "regulation by the
lifted eyebrow":
[A] prudent and responsible broadcaster is likely to be very responsive to the views of
the FCC Commissioners and staff, regardless of his own judgment as to public needs or
demands. . . . [TJhe fact has become a stereotype of FCC thinking which is reflected
in the clich6 of "regulation by the lifted eyebrow." This simply indicates recognition of
the fact that occasional martyrs or heroes will assert their independence regardless of
consequences to themselves; but, in general, people will bend to the will of those who
wield power over them, and the independence of individuals and enterprises will be
inversely proportional to the power government thus exerts.
Loevinger, Free Speech, Fairness, and Fiduciary Duty in Broadcasting, 34 LAw & CoNTEMP.
Paos. 278, 291 (1969).
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an independent programming decision, then the weighing of inter-
ests between licensee-government protection of the public interest
(children) and the first amendment rights of viewers to diverse pro-
gramming2 and full discussion of public issues will determine
whether the family viewing hour policy can withstand constitutional
challenge.
Family viewing hour, however, may still prove not to be in the
best interests of children because it could deteriorate into what one
organization termed the "family blandness hour."22 8 This might re-
sult because the phrase "unsuitable for family viewing" usually is
a catch-all to exclude not only violence or obscenity, but controversy
in the form of social issues or mature themes as well."' Not only did
the family viewing hour tend to prevent both adults and children
from viewing more complex issues, a result arguably prohibited by
Butler v. Michigan,'0 it also deprived both groups of the opportun-
ity to mutually explore difficult and topical issues during a time
period when families would most likely be together and able to
engage in such discussions.2'- Many parents would probably prefer
that the child see or hear programs on complex or controversial
issues in their presence in order that they may provide appropriate
explanations and interpretations.
Moreover, the family viewing hour policy may inadequately
serve the purpose for which it is intended. If the purpose is to shelter
children from sexual and violent communication, the scheme must
fail. As shown in this Note's Pacifica analysis, children can never
be removed from this communication without total prohibition of
the message because millions of children remain in the audience
after the arbitrary cutoff point of 9:00 p.m. 232
If the family viewing hour policy is designed to provide children
with stimulating shows developed specifically for their benefit, it
will likely still fail because children are traditionally the most neg-
227. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
228. Pre-Trial Memorandum of National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting and
Action for Children's Television as Amici Curiae at 37, Writers Guild of America, West, Inc.
v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
229. Id.
230. 352 U.S. 380 (1957). See note 109 supra and accompanying text.
231. Pre-Trial Memorandum, note 228 supra, at 6.
232. See Pre-Trial Memorandum, note 228 supra, at 41 (citing T.V. GUIDE, Apr. 26,
1975, at 6). Nielsen demographics for the fall 1975 schedule showed that the family viewing
hour had minimal impact. For the first two weeks of that fall, total adult viewing in that time
slot fell 6% from the previous year while the size of the children's share of the viewing
audience increased 4%. Significantly, the number of teenagers watching television in the post-
family viewing hour period of 9:00-11:00 p.m. increased 14% from the previous year.
BROADCASTING, Oct. 6, 1975, at 24. See Note, note 179 supra, at 104 n.169.
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lected audience and are offered the least amount of programming
for their age or interestm Moreover, special programming designed
specifically for children rather than for a wide audience range would
not be shown during prime time because it would not be economi-
cally advantageous. Prime-time programming would more likely be
a toned-down adult show, leaving both the adult and child with
inferior quality programming. Furthermore, the family viewing hour
policy seems to contradict both Red Lion's as well as the FCC's own
mandate of program diversification.23 Thus, the family viewing
hour policy would fail for practical as well as constitutional reasons.
VI. CONCLUSION
Throughout the nation's history courts have been faced with
the problem of protecting children from potentially harmful expres-
sion consistent with the demands of the first amendment. Pacifica,
the Supreme Court's most recent decision in this continuing strug-
gle between two worthwhile objectives, resolved the question in
favor of protectionism. This Note, however, argues that the protec-
tion of children, while a desirable goal, is an insufficient justifica-
tion for overriding the clear mandate of the first amendment.
Traditional theories that deal with children give the parent the
right to govern the type of expression to which his child is exposed.
Courts in situations similar to that in Pacifica should not allow the
government, rather than the parent, to abridge the child's constitu-
tional right to know and engage in the free exchange of information.
This is particularly true since the Court has banned offensive,
rather than obscene, speech despite the longstanding principle in
first amendment jurisprudence that prohibits content-based censor-
ship of protected speech unless it could withstand strict scrutiny.
Although the "unique characteristics" of broadcasting justify
greater regulation than in the case of print media, such regulation
has a more deleterious effect on first amendment standards. Due to
the "all or nothing" nature of broadcasting and its technological
limitations, total protection of children from offensive speech would
require the message to be withheld from adults and children whose
parents desire them to be exposed to it. The first amendment for-
bids such total prohibition of protected speech. Channeling, the
proposed compromise, fails to accomplish its purpose because many
children who go to bed at a later hour would still be subjected to
233. See Pre-Trial Memorandum, note 228 supra, at 41.
234. Broadcasters have an obligation "to provide diversified programming designed to
meet the varied needs and interests of the child audience." Children's Television Report and
Policy Statement, 50 F.C.C.2d 1, 5 (1974).
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the allegedly harmful message. Thus, the Pacifica Court's rationale
for its holding fails both practically as well as constitutionally.
Offensive speech still is protected speech and should be aired
at the broadcaster's discretion without government censorship. A
minor capable of mature, independent judgment will thereby be
exposed to diverse messages, enabling him to better take part in the
world of reason and the free exchange of ideas. A minor possessing
insufficient capacity should be guided in selecting the messages that
he will hear according to the tastes and values of his parents who
possess the right to mold their child's values and environment.
It is more consonant with the first amendment for someone who
is confronted by offensive speech in the broadcasting context to
simply avert his eyes or ears or change the channel. That short
moment of discomfort to someone who arguably invites the speech
by turning on the broadcast does not justify riding roughshod over
the first amendment. Furthermore, warnings before and during the
broadcast as well as a white dot in the television medium could
minimize the chances of being offended.
In a speech to broadcasters two weeks after the Pacifica deci-
sion, FCC Chairman Ferris told his audience: "I do not want that
case to lead to timidity in your coverage of controversial subjects.",,
In an effort to placate critics of Pacifica, he pointed to the Commis-
sion's decision of July 20, 1978, regarding WGBH-TV's license re-
newal proceedings' as illustrative of the restraint the FCC intends
to exercise when dealing with future indecency complaints.
In that proceeding, Morality in Media of Massachusetts filed a
petition asking the FCC not to renew WGBH's license because the
station was "consistently broadcasting offensive, vulgar and other-
wise material harmful [sic] to children without adequate supervi-
sion or parental warnings."m27 The Commission denied the petition,
rejecting the notion that the viewers' subjective opinions of what is
or is not good programming rather than specific showings of incon-
sistency with the public interest should be the basis for denying
license renewal. The Commission further stated that: "The Su-
preme Court's decision in [Pacifica] affords this Commission no
general prerogative to intervene in any case where words similar or
identical to those in Pacifica are broadcast over a licensed radio or
television station. We intend strictly to observe the narrowness of
235. Speech by FCC Chairman Charles D. Ferris to New England Broadcasters Associa-
tion, Boston, Mass., July 21, 1978, cited in Note, Morality and Broadcasting: FCC Control
of "Indecent" Material Following Pacifica, 31 FED. COM. L.J. 145, 169 & nn.105-07 (1978).
236. WGBH Educ. Foundation, 69 F.C.C.2d 1250, 43 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 1436 (1978).
237. Id. at 1250, 43 RAD. REG. 2d at 1438.
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the Pacifica holding.""*
Apparently, the FCC's present intention is to construe the
Pacifica decision very narrowly. This approach, however, has not
been shared by past Commission majorities, and what a Commis-
sion comprised of new members will subjectively find to be prohib-
ited, although not obscene, is uncertain31 The Court or the FCC
should establish definite regulations or guidelines to minimize the
subjectivity of case-by-case adjudication with its inherent danger of
abridgment of first amendment freedoms through inhibition of li-
censees' programming discretion. With explicit criteria as to what
communication will be prohibited, broadcasters will be better pre-
pared to provide the diverse programming contemplated by the first
amendment.
DABNEY ELIZABETH BRAGG
238. Id. at 1254, 43 RAD. REG. 2d at 1441. In announcing the decision, the FCC left the
programming decisions up to the licensee and said that its review was limited to whether a
licensee's overall programming adequately served the public interest, rather than whether
any particular program met this test.
239. The WGBH opinion is not as strong as one might think because Pacifica and
WGBH are clearly distinguishable. WGBH involved license renewal in which a finding of
indecency would have resulted in much harsher consequences than in Pacifica.
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